From: | Dave Page <dpage(at)pgadmin(dot)org> |
---|---|
To: | Pavel Stehule <pavel(dot)stehule(at)gmail(dot)com> |
Cc: | Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org> |
Subject: | Re: Application name patch - v2 |
Date: | 2009-10-19 08:30:56 |
Message-ID: | 937d27e10910190130h21d3bf2fq7697c633101a0f8a@mail.gmail.com |
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Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Mon, Oct 19, 2009 at 9:23 AM, Pavel Stehule <pavel(dot)stehule(at)gmail(dot)com> wrote:
> 2009/10/19 Dave Page <dpage(at)pgadmin(dot)org>:
>> On Mon, Oct 19, 2009 at 8:54 AM, Pavel Stehule <pavel(dot)stehule(at)gmail(dot)com> wrote:
>>> I dislike write access to app name guc for user too. It's not safe.
>>> Maybe only super user can do it?
>>
>> That'll render it pretty useless, as most applications wouldn't then
>> be able to set/reset it when it makes sense to do so.
>
> But application can do it simply via connection string, no? Mostly
> applications has connection string in configuration, so I don't see
> problem there. And if I would to allow access, then I could to wrap
> setting to security definer function.
It will prevent an application changing the value before running a
long operation which may warrant special identification. It will also
prevent applications changing the setting if you're running through a
pooler.
> I see this as security hole. It allows special SQL injection.
How so?
--
Dave Page
EnterpriseDB UK: http://www.enterprisedb.com
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