Re: Rejecting weak passwords

From: Dave Page <dpage(at)pgadmin(dot)org>
To: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>
Cc: Marko Kreen <markokr(at)gmail(dot)com>, Albe Laurenz <laurenz(dot)albe(at)wien(dot)gv(dot)at>, Andrew Dunstan <andrew(at)dunslane(dot)net>, mlortiz <mlortiz(at)uci(dot)cu>, Magnus Hagander <magnus(at)hagander(dot)net>, pgsql-hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: Rejecting weak passwords
Date: 2009-10-14 16:16:49
Message-ID: 937d27e10910140916n41a1d687g62c833353d8f06c0@mail.gmail.com
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On Wed, Oct 14, 2009 at 5:08 PM, Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us> wrote:
> Dave Page <dpage(at)pgadmin(dot)org> writes:
>> You've twice asserted it's a reduction without providing any arguments
>> to back that up.
>
> You quoted two good arguments why it's insecure in your original
> message, neither of which your proposed GUC does anything to protect
> against;

I see one, and I proposed masking passwords in any relevant queries
before they were written to the stats or logs to mitigate that.

> and you also admitted that there might be other leakage paths
> we haven't thought of.  That seems to me to be more than sufficient
> reason to not encourage people to go back to passing unencrypted
> passwords around.

Yes. Which is why I asked your opinion as there's a far greater chance
you would know of any such paths than I, *and* whether they represent
a greater risk than the complete lack of control over the
effectiveness of users passwords that we currently have.

--
Dave Page
EnterpriseDB UK: http://www.enterprisedb.com

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