Re: Dumping an Extension's Script

From: Andres Freund <andres(at)anarazel(dot)de>
To: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>
Cc: Dimitri Fontaine <dimitri(at)2ndQuadrant(dot)fr>, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnakangas(at)vmware(dot)com>, Simon Riggs <simon(at)2ndquadrant(dot)com>, Robert Haas <robertmhaas(at)gmail(dot)com>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org>
Subject: Re: Dumping an Extension's Script
Date: 2012-12-05 21:59:57
Message-ID: 20121205215956.GV27424@awork2.anarazel.de
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On 2012-12-05 16:42:38 -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> Andres Freund <andres(at)anarazel(dot)de> writes:
> > On 2012-12-05 16:20:41 -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> >> GUC or no GUC, it'd still be letting an unprivileged network-exposed
> >> application (PG) do something that's against any sane system-level
> >> security policy. Lipstick is not gonna help this pig.
>
> > What about the non-writable per cluster directory? Thats something I've
> > actively wished for in the past when developing a C module thats also
> > used in other clusters.
>
> I see no security objection to either per-cluster or per-database
> script+control-file directories, as long as they can only contain
> SQL scripts and not executable files.

Well, I was explicitly talking about C code above. The question doesn't
really have to do too much with this thread, sorry. Given I am proposing
the directory to be explicitly read-only and under permission that don't
allow postgres to change that its not really suitable for this topic...

Greetings,

Andres Freund

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