Re: [PATCHES] Backend SSL configuration enhancement
- From: "Victor B. Wagner" <vitus(at)cryptocom(dot)ru>
- To: Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net>
- Cc: Stefan Kaltenbrunner <stefan(at)kaltenbrunner(dot)cc>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org
- Subject: Re: [PATCHES] Backend SSL configuration enhancement
- Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2006 13:19:44 +0400
- Message-id: <20060831091944.GC9731@cryptocom.ru> <text/plain>
On 2006.08.31 at 10:34:02 +0200, Peter Eisentraut wrote:
> Am Donnerstag, 31. August 2006 11:29 schrieb Stefan Kaltenbrunner:
> > this is btw. something that is available in most daemons utilizing
> > openssl - one can disable weak ciphers (which might not even be known as
> > weak at the time the defaults where set) or ciphers not authorized for
> > certain usage scenarios by this means.
>
> In that case I'd expect to edit some central openssl configuration file to
> turn off the offending methods in one central place.
There is no such functionality in OpenSSL configuration file.
Moreover, other SSL applications such as Apache, use more fine-grained
apporoach - use different ciphersuite settings for virtual hosts and
even particular web pages.
Cipher strength is quantitive characteristic. In some cases same cipher
can be strong enough, and in some - not.
I can imagine scenarios where different databases or even different
roles in the same database would require different strength of cipher.
For example, user with read-only access to tables (say web server,
visualizing data) can connect without encryption at all, user with
update/insert permissions - with 128-bit encryption, and database
superuser - only with 256-bit.
But I don't think that implementation of such flexibility would be
neccessary until there would be certificate based database
authentication.
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