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Re: [pgadmin-hackers] Client-side password encryption


  • From: Tom Lane <tgl(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>
  • To: Christopher Kings-Lynne <chriskl(at)familyhealth(dot)com(dot)au>
  • Cc: Peter Eisentraut <peter_e(at)gmx(dot)net>, pgsql-hackers(at)postgresql(dot)org, Andreas Pflug <pgadmin(at)pse-consulting(dot)de>, Dave Page <dpage(at)vale-housing(dot)co(dot)uk>
  • Subject: Re: [pgadmin-hackers] Client-side password encryption
  • Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2005 00:37:22 -0500
  • Message-id: <20023(dot)1134970642(at)sss(dot)pgh(dot)pa(dot)us>

Christopher Kings-Lynne <chriskl(at)familyhealth(dot)com(dot)au> writes:
>> So it appears that pg_md5_encrypt is not officially exported from libpq.  
>> Does anyone see a problem with adding it to the export list and the 
>> header file?

> Is it different to normal md5?  How is this helpful to the phpPgAdmin 
> project?

It would be better to export an API that is (a) less random (why one
input null-terminated and the other not?) and (b) less tightly tied
to MD5 --- the fact that the caller knows how long the result must be
is the main problem here.

Something like
	char *pg_gen_encrypted_passwd(const char *passwd, const char *user)
with malloc'd result (or NULL on failure) seems more future-proof.

			regards, tom lane



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